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REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTION
JAN P. CHARMATZ and HAROLD M. WITtt
REPATRIATION of prisoners of war has created an impasse in world politics
and a challenge to international law. Failure to agree on a policy for the
release of prisoners captured in Korea is claimed to be the only remaining
reason for continued loss of life in combat and the prolonged detention of
hundreds of thousands of soldiers in prison compounds.' Thus hopes for
peace in Asia and for reduction in world tension devolve in large part on
the outcome of a debate-concerning a single point in international la%,.--
which has dragged on for over a year in the Panmunjom truce talks and
which will continue to concern the United Nations General Assembly in its
present session. From the outset the communists have demanded the re-
patriation of each and every prisoner captured by United Nations forces in
Korea.2 The United Nations has vigorously opposed this position. Original-
ly, the United Nations Command claimed that the principle of "voluntary
repatriation" should govern the exchange of prisoners and that only those
who "elect[ed] repatriation" should be sent home.3 Later, U.N. negotiators
withdrew this formula and substituted for it the principle of "no forced re-
patriation," which forms the core of the present controversy:
"[A]ll prisoners of war must be released but only those should be
repatriated or turned over to the other side who can be delivered
without the application of force."4
f-,isiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
;-Lieutenant (j.g.), U.S.N.R.
The opinions and assertions contained in this article are the private ones of the authors
and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department
or the Naval Service.
1. See. e.g., KoRAn: A Sum-aRY OF Du o sm'Is n THE Arnisrrcs \'r_ou1rTo-s
AND TEM PRISONER_ OF WAR CAmps, JuNE 1951-MAY 1952, Cm. No. 8596 at 11, 21-6
(1952); 45th Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, 27 DzPT
STATE Buu 272-3 (1952).
2. See KoRA: A SumrmAR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20-1.
3. Id. at 9, 18. In January, 1952, during the armistice negotiations in Korea, the United
Nations Command introduced a proposal "designed to insure that prisoners were only
repatriated with their own consent, i.e., prisoners would have the right to choose to be
set free on either side of the armistice demarcation line. .. .This [proposal] vas re-
jected by the Communists. The United Nations Command later receded frum thl prin-
ciple of 'voluntary repatriation' to that of 'no forced repatriation!" Id. at S.
For an account of the early phases of the Korean truce talks with reference to the
repatriation issue, see (Admiral) Joy, My Battle Inside the Korea Truce Tent. Col-
lier's, Aug. 16, 1952, p. 36; Aug. 23, 1952, p. 26; Aug. 30, 1952, p. 70.
4. Koa-k: A SummARY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20-1.
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This position has been maintained by the United Nations since April, 1952.
Past treatment given repatriated nationals of communist countries convinced
the leaders of the Western powers that Chinese and North Korean prisoners
on their return would be exposed to deprivations of human rights.6 Although
U.N. leaders stated they would not retain prisoners who wished to return
home, 6 they felt that repatriation by force would be inconsistent with the
humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention. To ascertain if force
would be required to send prisoners home, the United Nations in April,
1952, screened captured Chinese and North Koreans. Interrogation showed
that out of 170,000 captives only 70,000, or 40 percent, would not forcibly
resist repatriation.7 Openly expressed anti-communist feelings of many pris-
oners and the actual segregation of these captives after interrogation made
it probable that home states would learn of their opposition to repatriation.
The United Nations felt that this knowledge in the bands of communist
governments increased the likelihood that many thousands of war captives
would be subjected to severe deprivations. Recognizing the gravity of the
situation, President Truman declared: "We must not use bayonets to force
these prisoners to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands
of the communists. ' '8 To use force, British Foreign Secretary Eden main-
tained, "would .. .be repugnant to the sense of values of the free world."
5. See Hurudall, Crimea Disagreement, 44 THE ARMY QuARTELY 84, 94 (1952),
see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION 11 (1952).
"The very fact of his captivity was the accusation leveled against every Soviet pris-
oner of war." DAILIN & NIcoLAEvsKY, FORcED LABoR IN SovInE RUSSIA 296 (1947).
"In 1941 came the first convoys of Finns and detachments of Red Army soldiers who
had been captured on the Finnish front; these soldiers had marched under a decorated
triumphal arch in Leningrad, welcomed by streamers with the legend 'The Fatherland
greets its heroes,' and to the strains of the Budyenny March had been led straight to a
railroad siding beyond the town where sealed cattle trucks were waiting to take them
to the [labor] camps." HERuNG, A WoRLD ApART 65-6 (Mentor ed. 1952).
6. This very position was adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution, 427
(V) of December 14, 1950, which dealt with the detained World War II captives who
"should ...have been repatriated long since." The Resolution further stated: "(A]Il
prisoners should ...be given unrestricted opportunity of repatriation." YEuAnoo01' o
THE UNITED NATioNs-1950, p. 568 (1951).
7. Between the 5th and 15th of April, 1952, most Chinese and North Korean captives
were interrogated by the United Nations Command. KoREA: A SUMMARY, op. di. sa1pra
note 1, at 10. On April 19, 1952, the communist armistice delegation was informed that
of the 170,000 held by the United Nations, only approximately 70,000 would not resist
repatriation. For a breakdown of these figures according to North Korean soldiers,
Chinese soldiers, etc., see I(msiN's CONTEMPORARY ARCmVES 12194 (1952). By July
the final figures of the screening were made available to the communists. They showed
"83,000 prisoners who would not oppose repatriation including approximately 6,400
Chinese prisoners." 50th Report of the United Nations Command Operatioas in Korea,
27 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 958 (1952). For the text of the questions put to the prisoners,
see note 103 infra.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1952, p. 1, col. 4.
9. KoREA: A SuMMARY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24.
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All parties to the dispute have treated the issue of repatriation as a
matter of international law alone. A member of the Indian delegation to the
United Nations has declared: "The Chinese themselves and the Koreans
themselves have demanded that repatriation shall take place in terms of in-
ternational law. So far as we are concerned, therefore, this is common
ground."1 The General Assembly has agreed.' Its Resolution of December
3, 1952, stated:
"[T] he release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall be effected
in accordance with the 'Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War,' dated 12 August 1949, the well-estab-
lished principles and practices of international law and the relevant
provisions of the draft armistice agreement.""'
For the purposes of this discussion it is not important whether this apparent
respect for international law is genuine or motivated by a conviction that effec-
tive ideological warfare requires such an approach to the repatriation issue.
What is important is that the U.S.S.R., China, and North Korea have insisted
that international law supports their stand, and have attacked the United
Nations position as a flagrant violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.1 3
Although discussed exclusively as a problem of legal doctrine, the dis-
position of Korean prisoners of war will, of course, be determined by politi-
cal considerations growing out of the larger world-wide power struggle be-
tween the communist and non-communist worlds. Yet one source of strength
in the Iorean controversy-and in the global conflict as well-lies in the
ability of each of the major national governments to gain support for their
policies from other nations and from their own citizens as well. Support for
policies hinges on peoples' identifications; these, in turn, are shaped in part
by conceptions of what is right and wrong.' 4 And the "right" and "wrong" of
the Korean repatriation issue may well be linked by millions with the proper
application of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Competing interpretatiton' of
the Convention are thus important political weapons in the dispute over thv
10. Statement of the Representative of India, Mr. Menon, at the 525th Meeting of
Committee I, Nov. 19, 1952. U.S. DE=EG. Don US/A/C.l/2542, p. 7 (1952).
11. "The [General Assembly's] First Committee's general debate on the Korean
question was concluded on November 24, exactly a month after it began. Fifty-three
statements had been made at seventeen meetings. There were five draft resolutions-a
joint 21-nation proposal, and those of the U.S.S.R., Mexico, Peru, and India." The Scarch
for an Agreed Solution on Repatriatbig Korea Prisoners, 13 U.N. BmL. 4S7 (1952).
On the basis of these discussions Committee I passed a resolution which was adopted
by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952.
12. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1952, p. 3, coL 1; Dec. 4, 1952, p. 3, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Statements of the Representative of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Vyshinsky, at the
514th Meeting of Committee I, Oct. 29, 1952, U.S. DEX.n. Doc. US/A/C.1/253S, p. 125
(1952); and at the 529th Meeting of Committee I, Nov. 24, 1952, U.S. DZLWr. Doc.
US/A/C.1/2543, pp. 2, 5 (1952).
14. See McDougal, Law and Power, 46 Am J. INT'L L 102 (1952).
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Korean prisoners of war. Moreover, if the controversy's solution, however
politically motivated, is consistent with a reasonable construction of inter-
national law, this consistency will help to further the United Nations' goal
of a world order based on law.
No doctrinal analysis of specific Convention articles, however, has been
advanced during the Korean debates by any statesman except one-the
delegate from the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei Vyshinsky. And because all
nations concerned talk about the issue at least in general legal terms, be-
cause conceptions of right and wrong are significant sources of power, and
because of the importance of establishing a world order based on law, a
doctrinal analysis of the 1949 Geneva Convention is necessary. Such an
inquiry must determine both the correct interpretation of pertinent treaty
provisions and their application to specific factual situations, particularly the
present Korean impasse.
INTERPRETING THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION
The attack on the United Nations position and the alternative offered to
it are based on an attempted "literal" reading of Articles 118 and 7 of the
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.',
The first paragraph of Article 118 reads:
"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay
after the cessation of active hostilities.' 0
15. Though the 1949 Convention has not been ratified by the signatories, neverthe-
less, it has been accepted as governing by the United Nations. KOREA: A SUMMARY, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 26. Not only has the United Nations recognized the gonvention. On
July 13, 1950, the North Korean authorities declared that they would abide by the 1949
Convention on prisoners of war; and on July 16, 1952, the Chinese communists, with reserva-
tions, made a similar pledge. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1952, p. 1, col. 3.
Recognition of the 1949 Convention by all parties concerned in Korea is in accord with
the general view that the rules concerning land warfare and the treatment of captives
are applicable with or without formal adhesion to a treaty, since they themselves are only
codifications of generally recognized customs of war. 2 OPPENIMt, INTERNATlONAL LAW
234 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1952).
16. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR oF
AuG'uST 12, 1949, Art. 118 (1949), provides in full:
"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation
of active hostilities.
"In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded be-
tween the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any
such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without
delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing
paragraph.
"In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the pris-
oners of war.
"The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned
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Article 7 states:
"Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in
entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and
by... special agreements .... 11
Mr. Vyshinsky, the most vociferous "literalist," maintains there is no
need to look behind the words of Article 118; captor states are obligated to
repatriate all prisoners of war without exception, no matter what the pre-
vailing conditions-and that is all there is to it. After considering "the
categoric formula" of Article 118, he queries:
"Is that not dear? No agreement is necessary;... nothing at all is
necessary. The International Convention of 1949 is self-enforcing,
because it says: in the absence of agreement, each of the powers
which holds war prisoners shall, must, is compelled by itself, on its
own account, to draw up and carry out a repatriation plan in keeping
with the principles set out above [Articles 118 and 7. .... Now,
what are you going to do about that? Here is a principle of inter-
national law."' 8
And Mr. Vyshinsky contends that the principle of Article 118 sets forth a
right made irrevocable by Article 7. "In other words, there is a special article
which says that war prisoners are not entitled to waive their rights ...
What right? The right to be repatriated." 10 To Mr. Vyshinsky the "literalist"
view is the only one, the reflection of the "categoric formula," the "principle
of international law."20' To him the words of the Convention are compelling.
between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This appor-
tionment shall be carried out on the following basis:
"(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the pri- ners of var
depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
-(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall hear the c,,sts
of transport of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frntikr sir it; p rt
of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisianers .,f war f -
pend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the oelitntle app ,r-
tionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement -'1al
in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisuners of war."
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are printed in SE.-;. E.Ec. Doc. Luas D, E, F,
& G, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The four, along with previous conventiuns cvcermirg
the rules of war, also are reprinted in 47 NAvAL. WAR COLYLEGE, IT'L LAw Doz-Ir:;yS
(1952).
17. Art. 7 of the 1949 Convention in full provides:
"Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights
secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in
the foregoing Article, if such there be."
18. Statement of Mr. Vyshinsky to the 514th Meeting of the Political and Security
Committee (Committee I of the General Assembly) of the United Nations, Oct. 29, 1952,
U.S. Dm.G. Doc. U.S./A/C.1/2538, pp. 86-7 (1952).
19. Id. at 88.
20. Id. at 86, 87.
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They embody "the law." And a "law cannot be turned around like a cart in
various directions and pulled hither and yon; it cannot be used as a shuttle-
cock." 2 1
Literalist thinking about statutes and treaties assumes that words are un-
ambiguous and therefore require no interpretation.2 2 But to apply statutes
and treaties to specific situations, decision-makers must always interpret,
since words gain meaning only from context. 23 What are statutes and treaties
without interpretation? "Nothing but a combination of paper and printer's
ink."24 Thus Mr. Vyshinsky cannot claim his position is the truth. It repre-
sents his interpretation of the 1949 Convention. In effect, Mr. Vyshinsky
reaches his position on repatriation by adding words to Articles 118 and 7.
Article 118 seems to emerge as:
Detaining powers are required to release and repatriate all pris-
oners of war without delay after the cessation of hostilities no matter
what prisoners wish, and no matter what deprivations may await
them when they return home.
And Article 7 becomes:
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in
entirety the rights secured to them by the Convention and by special
agreements even if the enforcement of a right would be a deprivation
for them.
The real issue is not whether or not the literalist view is "the law" and
the United Nations position "an interpretation"; the issue is which interpreta-
tion is compatible with generally accepted modern principles of treaty interpre-
tation. When decision makers interpret a treaty, they give its text mean-
ing for a specific problem.25 But statesmen cannot legitimately give treaty
21. Id. at 94.
22. Id. at 86. An attempt to show that the words of Art. 27 of the U.N. Charter are
unambiguous and mandatory and that there is "scarcely any room for doubt" was made
by Professor Gross. Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and
Absence from Meetings, 60 YAi LJ. 209 (1951). He attempted to prove that the voting
procedure of the Security Council on the Korean Resolution of June, 1950, was "illegal,"
The defects and dangers of this mode of thinking were shown by McDougal & Gardner,
The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretatim for Survival, 60 YAiL L.J. 258, 262-9
(1951).
23. See, e.g., CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS (1938).
24. SCHLOSSMiANN, DER IRRTum UEBER WESENTUCHE EIGENSCHAYEN DER PERSON
UND DER SACHE NACH DEm BUFGERLiCHEN GEsrEZBucH: ZuGLEIcu rAN BEITRAG zuR
THLORIE DER GESETZESAUSLEGUNG 27 (1903) (authors' translation). See also McDougal
& Gardner, supra note 22, at 263.
25. "Few terms of art may be said to exist in international law, and as the terms
employed in international instruments seldom have an exact meaning, they can be inter-
preted only by giving content to them. This is not a matter of mechanical operation; it
is not a process which performs itself automatically; results have to be kept in mind,
judgment must be exercised, many factors must be appreciated" HUDSON, THE PEaMA-
NENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, pp. 641-2 (1943). See also, Harvard
Research Draft on Treaties, 29 A-,i. J. INT'L L. Supv. 653, 946 (1935).
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words any meaning or referents they wish. They are limited among other
things by the signatories' major demands and expectations -2 evidenced by
treaty purposes and legislative history. By making their purposes clear, the
framers of the 1949 Geneva Convention erected certain barriers designed to
limit the meaning future officials could give to Convention words.27 The
legislative history of Articles 118 and 7 impose additional limitations. -5 And
interpreters must also consult the doctrines and practices of international
law which constituted the drafters' frame of reference and, as such, form an
integral part of legislative history.29 Yet since treaty makers cannot fore-
see the future, officials must adapt interpretations to conditions existing at
the time of decision. The Harvard Research Draft on Treaties agrees with
this formulation of principles of treaty interpretation:
"A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose
which it is intended to serve. This historical background of the treaty,
travaux pr paratoires, the circumstances of the parties at the time
the treaty was entered into, the change in these circumstances sought
to be effected, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the
provisions of the treaty, and the conditions prevailing at the time
interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with
the general purpose which the treaty is intended to serve. ' Co
Convention Purposes
Few treaties exist whose major purposes are as obvious as those of the
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Delegates to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference characterized their
work as "inspired solely by humanitarian aims."2' The Convention itself it
designed for the "protection" of prisoners of war.2 2 The text provides that
prisoners of war must be protected against violence or intimidation and
humanely treated "at all times." 33 They are to be spared insults to their
dignity as human beings.34 And captors are warned that "any unlawful act
26. McDougal & Gardner, sapra note 22, at 266 n.37.
27. For a full discussion of the purposes of 1949 Gax-vA Cozxvm"vo.: Rro A--aT ro
THE TRFAT=MXT OF PRIsoxsaE OF WAR, see text at pages 397-3 infra.
28. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Convention. text at pagsc
398-405 infra.
29. For a discussion of doctrines and practices of international law relevant to re-
patriation of prisoners of war, see text at pages 405-9 in ra.
30. Harvard Research, supra note 25, at 937.
31. Resolutions of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, Res. 3, Sn.. EnEc.
Doc LE-rzS D, E, F, & G, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1951).
32. The full title of the Convention reads: GE.NVA CoNvE.NTzoN¢ REIATvrVE TO TE
TREATME.IT OF PisoERs or WAR, AUGUST 12, 1949 (1949). It is one of four GL:;E.x
CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION o VAR VIcTrs (1949), all of which were opened for
signature on the same day.
33. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TRATME NT OF Pmso:NEs t~V WoAR.
AUGUST 12, 1949, Art. 13 (1949).
34. Id. at Art. 14.
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or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering
the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded
as a serious breach of the present Convention. 35, Provisions governing re-
patriation, like all other parts of the Convention, must be viewed in the light
of these purposes.30
By recalling the climate of opinion existing after World War II, one can
appreciate the Drafters' deep commitment to humanitarian principles. The
Convention was written during a period of increasing awareness that the
protection and promotion of human rights are intimately associated with
the conditions necessary to secure permanent peace. The Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Draft
Covenants of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, as well as the 1946
General Assemby Resolution on Refugees, all indicate that awareness. The
so-called "literalist" interpretation fails to consider as significant this con-
cern which is expressed in the purposes of the Convention and in its legislative
history as well.
Legislative History: Convention Conferences
The genesis of the Convention as recorded shows that the words of Article
118 represent an attempt to imp rove upon Article 75 of the 1929 Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of Vrar in the light of the experience
of World War 11.37 Article 75 of the 1929 Convention provided that in the
event of an armistice, belligerents "in principle" were obligated to "have
appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war."
If belligerents made no such stipulations, then they were to conclude a re-
patriation agreement "as soon as possible." "In any case," however, repatria-
tion was to be effected "with the least possible delay after the conclusion of
peace."'38 Under a literal interpretation of the 1929 Convention, detaining
35. Id. at Art. 13.
36. In addition to its purposes a decision-maker when interpreting should also conx-
sider the legislative history of the treaty, general principles of international law and the
conditions prevailing at the time the interpretation is being made. See McDougal &
Gardner, supra note 22, at 266 et seq.; and see also text at pages 396-7 supra.
37. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE TREATmENT OF PISONERS OF WAR, 27
JuLy 1929, Art. 75 (1929). For a comparison between the 1929 and 1949 Conventions,
see Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT"L L. 294 (1949).
An appraisal of the 1949 Conventions is made in Yingling & Ginnane, The Gencva Con-
ventiots of 1949, 46 Amt. J. Ir'iL L. 393 (1952). For a brief general discussion on re-
patriation, see Potter, Repatriation of Prisoners of War, 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 508 (1952).
The most thorough discussion of past repatriation practices is GorrLiun, RE'ATRIATON
IN THEORY AND IN PRACrIcE THROUGHOUT THE FIRST WORLD WAR (unpublished thesis
in Bryn Mawr College Library, 1945).
38. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATmENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, 27
JuLy 1929, Art. 75 (1929) reads in full:
"When belligerents conclude a convention of armistice, they must, in principle, have
appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war. If it has not
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powers, on the pretext of complying with the letter of Article 75, could
rationalize their retention of prisoners until peace treaties were signed. 9 And
World War II experience showed that final settlements between belligerents--
peace treaties or unilateral declarations-often are delayed for many years
after hostilities end or perhaps indefinitely.40 To prevent the detention of
prisoners long after any apparent military reason for their captivity remained
was a major reason for the "categorical" language of Article 118 of the 1949
Convention.41 Article 118 attempted to improve on Article 75 of the 1929
Convention, by introducing a definite time--"after the cessation of hostilities"
-when detaining powers are obligated to repatriate prisoners of war. What
was not changed was the nature of the obligation itself.-
At the Conference of Government Experts, which met at Geneva in 1947
to consider International Red Cross proposals for a new convention, World
been possible to insert stipulations in this regard in such convention, belligerents shall
nevertheless come to an agreement in this regard as soon as possible. In any case, re-
patriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion
of peace.
"Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution might be pending for a crime
or an offense of municipal law may, however, be detained until the end of the proceedings
and, if necessary, until the expiration of the punishment. The same shall be true of those
sentenced for a crime or offense of municipal law.
"On agreement between the belligerents, commissions may be established for the pur-
pose of searching for dispersed prisoners and assuring their repatriation."
This article represented an improvement over Art. 20 of the -Lu Cov-o:E
(IV) REsEMCNG THE LAWS AND Cusromis OF ,VAn Oi LAND (1907) and Art 20 of the
HArGuE Co V=E orN (II) wrTH REsPEcr To THE LAws AND CusTo 0s opr Wn ON LAND
(1899), which both contained merely the following provision:
"After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall take place
as speedily as possible."
See reprints in 47 NAvAL WAR Cos.tno, INiT'L Ltw DocmriErs 33, 16 (1952).
39. The Russians, for instance, might claim even seven years after the end of hos-
tilities that they are not obligated under international law to return Japanese and German
prisoners of xwar still under their control because they have not concluded treaties of
peace with Germany and Japan.
40. The Peace Treaty with Japan was concluded at San Francisco, Sept. 8, 1951, sLx
years after her surrender. U.S. DEPARTnMENT OF STAT, TREATrY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN
(1952). Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were present at the San Francisco Confer-
ence, but did not sign the Treaty. Id. at Introductory Remarks. "The Convention with the
Federal Republic of Germany," the so-called Bonn Contractual Agrcements, to %%hich
Russia is not a party, is not a peace treaty. See SEN. E.mc. REP. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1952).
"The method of putting an end to hostilities by way of 'unconditional surrender' in-
stead of the customary armistice agreements was adopted at the end of the Second
Vorld War...." 2 OP.PENEni, op. cit. wpra note 15, at 552.
41. See text at page 394 supra.
42. See, e.g., the statement of the French Representative to the 1949 Diplomatic Con-
ference, M. Lamarle. II-B FiNA. RncoRD OF THE DipLOIATIc CoNFr_2nNcz or GE.2.sVA
314 (1950):
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War II repatriation experience was thoroughly examined. 4 This experience
provided the frame of reference for the thoughts and reactions of the Govern-
ment Experts as well as the Delegates to the 1949 Geneva Conference. Certain
captors forcibly retained prisoners long after hostilities ended, despite specific
agreements to the contrary.44 This practice generally has been condemned
as a flagrant violation of international law! 5 Most prisoners of war were
43. The movement to revise the 1929 Geneva Convention began in July, 1945, when
"the United States Provost Marshal General of the European Theater of Operations sug-
gested to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross that a meeting
of experts on prisoner of war affairs of the various belligerent nations be called ...
About sixteen nations ... sent their experts to a parley at Geneva during April, 1947
[the Conference of Government Experts] .... The XVIIth International Conference of
Red Cross invited delegations to Stockholm, Sweden, in August of 1948, to attempt a
draft revision of the Convention of 1929. About sixty nations attended and two weeks of
most fruitful labors utilizing the reports of the 1947 conference of experts brought
forth a draft revision [of the 1929 Convention] which became the working text of the
[1949] Diplomatic Conference ... ." Dillon, The Genesis of the 1949 Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 40, 43-4 (1950). See also Pictet,
The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45 Am. J. INT'L L.
462 (1951).
44. Russia still retains many hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals taken cap-
tive during World War II. In 1950 it was estimated that at least 1,500,000 Germans and
Japanese prisoners of war were "missing" in Russia. See NORTH ATLANTIC INFORMATION
SERvcE, ATLANTIC SERIEs, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 60 (1952). Many of these, of
course, can be presumed to be dead. It has been alleged further that some missing Japanese
were last known to be in territory under Chinese communist control. N.Y. Times, Aug.
28, 1952, p. 6, col. 5.
Soviet retention of prisoners of war is not only contrary to the spirit of the 1929
Geneva Convention, but to specific agreements made with her wartime Allies as well.
For a reprint of the AGREEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AT Moscow, REGARDING REI'ATRIA-
TioN OF GERMAN WAR PRISONERS, OF APRIL 23, 1947, see 23 D.P'T STAT BuLa,
431 (1950); for the PoTsDAm DECLARA ON DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER,
July 26, 1945, § 9, and the AGREEMENT BE-wT- THE U.S.S.R. AND THlE SULREME
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED PowERs IN JAPAN, DEc. 19, 1946, see ibid. See also
DEvERALL, JAPAN's Sov=r HEr PusoN RaS OF WAR (1951); FEHLiNG, ONE G rAT
PRISON (1951).
45. At the request of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the
question of the "failure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to repatriate or other-
wise account for prisoners of war detained in Soviet territory" was placed on the agenda
of the fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The complaint was
considered for many months by two committees of the General Assembly. YEARnoo OF
THE UNim NATIo Ns-1950, p. 564 (1951). A resolution (427(V)) of December 14,
1950, adopted at the 325th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, set up an ad hoc
committee to investigate the matter of "missing" prisoners of war. Id. at 568. It was
asserted in this resolution "that all prisoners having originally come within the control
of the Allied Powers as a consequence of the Second World War should either have been
repatriated long since or have been otherwise accounted for." U.N. Doe. A/1749, p. 1
(1950). Russia has consistently refused to cooperate with this committee, which was
established "with a view to settling the question of the prisoners of war in a purely
humanitarian spirit," although the committee has attempted to be as conciliatory as pos.
sible in order to reach a solution "on terms acceptable to all the governments concerned."
Note, 5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATiON 728 (1951).
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repatriated without being offered a choice; nor did they claim that they should
be given one. The Red Cross also reported to the Delegates that
"[lit happened fairly often [after World War II that POW were
repatriated against their will. This led to numerous suicides, as
POW were sometimes afraid, with or without valid reason, to return
home."
40
These forced repatriations were discussed by the Delegates, but not con-
demned. For those prisoners of war who were returned home against their
will were repatriated to territory under allied control where no threat to
their basic human rights existed.47 Some states, however, did base repatria-
tion on prisoners' choice. After World War II, England and France needed
manpower and gave enemy prisoners of war under their control the alter-
native of returning home or remaining.48 And the Russians announced that
certain enemy soldiers could choose whether they wished to remain in Russia,
46. Geneva Convention of J., 27, 1929, relativi to the Treatnwnt of Prisoners of
War in 2 Co?,_nssioN OF Gov m railT Exprrs, PrEimmnuARy Docut.Tms Sunvurrm
BY THE INT=RATIONAL COMiMITEE OF THE RED Cuoss 187 (1947).
"Mlany prisoners of war of Italian and German nationality desired to remain in this
country [the United States] rather than be repatriated... The policy was adopted early
in the prisoner-of-war program that every prisoner of war must be repatriated and that
none could remain here as residents or citizens irrespective of their desire or supporting
reasons. No exception was made to this rule." Tollefson, Enemy Prisoners of l!'ar, 32
IowA L. REv. 51, 75 (1946).
The only recorded case in the United States of a prisoner insisting that he should not
be repatriated is that of Mario D'Elia, an Italian prisoner of war. The Department of the
Judge Advocate General of the Army recognized that Art. 75 of the 1929 Geneva Con-
vention did not require that D'Elia be repatriated against his wishes, and that whether or
not he should be allowed to remain in the United States was a question of policy.
MALEMORANDUM FOR THE JuDGE ADvocATE GEsrmNxL, SuBjEcr: REPAT= Tio.' o ITALAN-
PaRsoaNzs OF WVAR AF-r CEssAriON OF HosruIrrIns (Jan. 15, 1945). In re Territo,
156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946), is concerned only with the question of the proper criteria
for determining whether a captive is or is not a prisoner of ,var. An "obligation" of detaining
powers to repatriate or release wvas mentioned only as dictum in the opinion of the District
and Circuit Courts. Id. at 144, 145.
47. The Russian ex-soldiers who were forcibly returned to Russia in the Fall of 1945
from the U.S. Zone of Germany were not sent back under Art. 75 of the 1929 Geneva
Convention. Since they had been liberated they no longer had the status of prisoners of
war. They were turned over to the Russian army under the AGREE ,ENT RExLTING ro
PRiso-ES OF WVAR AN CivL LAxs LmRATED By FoacEs OPEFT I UNDEm UriE STATES
OF AanalcA COMM AND (concluded at Yalta, Feb. 11, 1945) (usually cited as the Deane-
Gryzlov Agreement) to facilitate speedy repatriation. See 14 DnET STATE Buu.. 443-5
(1946).
48. In 1948, 24,000 English-held German prisoners of war chose to remain in Eng-
land rather than return home. Stadulis, The Resettlenmwt of Displaced Pcrsonrs in the
United Kingdom, 5 POPULATION STUDIES 207, 213 (1952). Regarding the choice given
French-held German prisoners of war see, e.g., BYasNs, SpEAR G FnA:.mLY 16S-9
(1947); 18 DFP'T STATE BULL. 221 (1948).
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return home, or go elsewhere. 49 As an inducement to surrender, the Soviet
commander at Stalingrad guaranteed officers and soldiers the choice of re-
turning after the war to Germany "or to any other country where the prisoner
of war should desire to go."5 ° At Budapest the Russians made a similar
proposal. 5 '
Although aware of this variety of practices, the Government Experts pre-
ferred to frame a general repatriation article, rather than provide in detail
for specific problems that might arise.5 2 The Rapporteur invited discussion
on whether the Conference wished to prohibit a detaining power from re-
patriating unwilling prisoners, but none was forthcoming; no proposals were
made.r3 The Experts feared that detaining powers, under the guise of com-
pliance with a provision making exceptions to repatriation, might prevent
captives from returning home. General Bryan, the American delegate, warned
that "if we allow escape clauses in this article, we risk reducing the [repatria-
tion] principle to nothing."5 4 The fact that Russia retained prisoners cap-
tured during World War II, in violation of special agreements,5 5 may have
provided a basis for this fear.
At the Diplomatic 'Conference held at Geneva in 1949, discussion focused
on the relation between repatriation and asylum.5 0 The consensus at the
Conference was that detaining powers had granted asylum in the past and
would do so in the future. What particularly concerned the Delegates was
whether or not detaining powers should be obligated to extend permanent
asylum to prisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated." The Delegates
concurred 58 in the Government Experts' earlier refusal to impose this obli-
49. International Free Trade Union News, July, 1952, p. 1, col. 2; Izvestia, Jan, 17,
1943, p. 1, (offer at Stalingrad) ; Krasnia Zvezva, Jan. 1, 1945 (offer at Budapest).
50. International Free Trade Union News, July, 1952, p. 1, col. 2.
51. Hungarian captives were promised a screening process to determine whether they
wished to be repatriated or not. Ibid.
52. CONFRECE D'ExPERTS GOUVFERNIENTAUX POufR iETUDE DES CONVENTIONS
PROTEGEANT LES VICTIES DE LA GLERRE, GENEVE, 14-26 AVRIL, 1947, PV, CoMMISSION II,
Vol. III, tome 3, p. 340 (1947).
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. See note 44 supra.
56. II-B FINAL RECOaD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 313, 314. During these discussions
what is now Article 118 was then Article 108 of the DRAFT Rvism On N w CONvEN-
TIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS (1948). The discussion on asylum was pro-
duced -by the provision of the last paragraph of Article 109 (then Article 100 of the
so-called "Stockholm Draft') which provides: "No sick or injured prisoner of war who
is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of this Article, may be repatriated
against his will during hostilities"' This article requires only temporary asylum, i.e.,
.asylum during hostilities.
57. II-B FINAL RECoRD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 312-14.
58. For the relevant opinion expressed at the Diplomatic Conference see note 62
infra.
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gation.59 A major reason for the Delegates' refusal is found in the folinwing
summary of the Canadian representative's statement:
"He urged that no Detaining Power should be comnpdlcd to keep
in its territory prisoners of war who did not wish to return home.
It might even be dangerous particularly for small States, to retain
too large a number of prisoners in their territory. He was certain
that if a prisoner produced valid reasons for refusing repatriation
(for instance, danger of death in the event of returning to his own
country), no camp commandant would repatriate him against his
will, at least in Canada." 60
The Delegates also rejected the further suggestion that the repatriation
articles expressly should grant detaining powers an option to accede or not
to prisoners' requests to avoid repatriation. 1' Apart from previously men-
tioned objections to "escape clauses" by the Government Experts, the Dele-
gates felt such an express option might create the unjustified exp2ctation in
prisoners that they could claim asylum as a right. But British and French
representatives at the Diplomatic Conference felt strongly that the Convention
should not alter the established doctrine and practices of asylum. Although,
at the time, the wording of another article was under discussion, the statements
of these representatives were apparently applicable to all repatriation situa-
tions. The traditional discretion of nation states to grant or withhold asylum,
they declared, was not to be impaired. 2 Available evidence does not indicate
that these declarations were contradicted.
One episode in the legislative history of Article 118 deserves special men-
tion because of the emphasis Mr. Vyshinsky has placed upon it 0 and because
it represents the only occasion on which a non-repatriation proposal came
to a vote. The rejection by the Diplomatic Conference of the Austrian pro-
posal that "prisoners of war must have the option of not returning to their
country if they so desire'6 has been cited as conclusive proof that Article
59. CoNF--mEcE D'ExrEvrs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 340-2.
60. II-A FnrAL PcoRD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 291 (statement in connection with
Art. 109; emphasis added).
61. See II-B id. at 312-14. See also discussion, text at page 402 supra.
62. See II-B FiNAL REcoRD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 312-14. Concerning Art. 109, the
U.K. representative, Mr. Gardiner, stated: "I suggest that a country should ba allowed to de-
cide for itself whether it will give refuge and asylum to a foreigner who has ccme to that
country not by a voluntary act of his own; for instance, when a Detainitig Power is Eatis-
fied that he has good grounds for staying, but there should not be an obligation on the
Detaining Power to keep a prisoner of war.. .. " Id. at 313. M. Lamarle of France sup-
ported Mr. Gardiner: "Moreover, as the United Kingdom Delegate pointed out, no ques-
tion of any kind of right of sanctuary arises.... It is natural, however, or at least it
seems natural to me... that the Detaining Power should reserve its own discretion. This
would of course not prevent it from taking account of any circumstances which seemed
to merit consideration." Id. at 314.
63. See Vyshinsky's statement, U.S. DELEG., op. cit. sutra note 14, at S.
64. I-A FiNAL REcom, op. cit. supra note 42, at 402.
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118 provides no exceptions for prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated. 0
The proposal read:
"Subject to the provisions of the following paragraph, prisoners
of war shall be repatriated to the country whose nationals they are
at the time of their repatriation.
"Prisoners of war, however, shall be entitled to apply for their
transfer to any other country which is ready to accept them." '
This amendment was rejected by a "large majority. 1' 7 Both the Russian
and the American delegates voted against it.68
The Delegates seem to have defeated the amendment decisively for the
same reasons they had not included in Article 118 either an obligation or
an express option to grant asylum. First, General Sklyarov presented the official
Russian position when he expressed his fear "that a prisoner of war might not be
able to express himself with complete freedom when he was in captivity." He
further claimed that such a "provision might give rise to the exercise of undue
pressure on the part of the Detaining Power."' 9 Russian desire to avoid
escape clauses may also have reflected her fear that in the event of a future
conflict many captured Russian soldiers would not return home if given a
choice.70 The American delegation was concerned lest such a clause might
tempt detaining powers in a future war to force American captives to state
that they do not wish repatriation. 71 Thus one reason for rejection was the
desire not to give an escape clause the sanction of treaty words. But a second,
and more compelling reason for rejection seems to stem from the actual
language of the Austrian proposal. The clear implication of the amendment
was that it imposed on the captor country an obligation to grant at least
temporary asylum, and that it entitled the prisoners to demand transfer to a
third country. At an earlier stage of the Conference, the Delegates had found
such an obligation objectionable. And Mr. Gardiner, the British delegate,
65. See, e.g., Vyshinky's statement, U.S. DELnG., op cit. supra note 18, at 88.
66. II-A FINAL RECORD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 324.
67. Id. at 462.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. The resistance to repatriation by many Russian nationals after World War II
shows these fears were well founded. "There were large numbers [in the United States
Zone of Germany] who did not wish to be repatriated because of their political beliefs,
including the Baltic people and the western Ukrainians, whose states had been absorbed
by the Soviet Union." CLAY, DEcISION IN GERMANY 231-2 (1950). See also the Editorial
in 62 THE: CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1373 (1945) ; Penrose, Negotiating on Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons, 1946 in DENNErT & JOHNSON, NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS 139,
140 (1951); UNRRA, THE CENTRAL CoMMTxTE OF THE COUNCIL, DOCUMENTS O' TIu
SPECL& SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESOLUTION 71, FEB. 12, 1946: REPORT ON TIlE ADMIN1smA-
TioN'S OPErATONs UNDER RESOLUION 71, Doc. CC/SS(46)4, p. 3 (1946).
71. The same attitude was displayed by the American delegates at the Conference
of Government Experts in 1947. See text at page 402 supro.
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felt the Austrian proposal further obliged captors to accede to prisoners' de-
mands for transfer to a third country.72 Because these were the reasons for
rejection, defeat of the Austrian proposal provides no support for the position
that Article 118 requires repatriation of each and every prisoner.
Thus nothing exists in the text of the 1949 Geneva Convention or in the
record of the conferences preceding it to indicate that states were meant
to be prohibited from granting asylum to prisoners of war. And in the light
of the variety of World War II repatriation practices, it is clear that the
Delegates assumed that offering asylum was compatible with the new repatria-
tion article and general international law.
Article 118 recognizes that the paramount desire of prisoners of war is
"to be returned as quickly as possible to the sphere of their national activi-
ties." 73- Since for most prisoners failure to be returned would be a major
deprivation, repatriation is protected as a "right." And Articles 6 and 7
protect "rights" established by the Convention. Article 6 7 forbids govern-
ments concerned from bargaining away "rights" of prisoners; Article 7
restrains war prisoners themselves from doing so. If, however, a prisoner
opposes repatriation and it is deemed that returning him will endanger his
life, liberty or dignity, to say that a man loses a "right" by not being forced
home under such circumstances is strange doctrine indeed. It is proper for a
home state to insist that "rights" of prisoners guaranteed under the Con-
vention be honored. If repatriation, however, would amount to a denial of
human rights, a home state's insistence that its nationals be returned, based
on a claim that it is protecting a right, should not be honored. For forcible
repatriation under these circumstances would represent a perversion of the
purposes of the entire Convention.
Legislative History: International Law Doctrite and Practice
Article 118 was drafted to set forth clearly and unequivocally a right to be
repatriated. Articles 6 and 7 were included to protect that right and others.
But the records of the proceedings further show the desire of the Convention
72. II-A .iML REcoRD, op. cit. supra note 42, at 324.
73. Statement of the Belgian representative at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. II-A
FiNA. Rzco, op. cit. supra note 42, at 295-6.
74. GE:EVA Co-VENTiON RELATVE TO THE T F-t',NT OF PnIsoNEs OF WA, o
AUGUST 12, 1949, Art. 6 (1949) reads: "In addition to the agreements expressly provided
for in Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 109, 110. 118, 119, 122 and 132,
the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for all matters cn-
cerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate provision. No special agree-
ment shall adversely affect the situation of prisoners of war, as defined by the present
Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
"Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the
Convention is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are
contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable ra
sures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict."
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drafters not to discard, but rather to implement, relevant general doctrines
and practices of international law, 5 in existence long before 1949.
The most comprehensive statement of these principles is found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.70 The Declaration affirms a "faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person"
without which achievement of long-range United Nations goals, as mapped
by the Charter, would be impossible.77 The United Nations interpretation
of the 1949 Convention is consistent with fundamental individual rights set
out in the Declaration. A right to be repatriated is a specific application of
the right "to leave any country and to . . . return to [it]" (Art. 13(2)) and
not to "be arbitrarily deprived of ... nationality" (Art. 15 (2)). Article 9 of the
Declaration-"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary . . . detention or exile"
-buttresses the position that Article 118 prohibits captors from forcibly
retaining prisoners of war. These principles as well as the words of Article
118 provide strong support for the proposition that a prisoner's desire to be
repatriated must be honored. But the right to "life, liberty and the security
of person" (Art. 3), the right not to be subjected to "slavery or servitude"
(Art. 4), the right not to "be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" (Art. 5), the right "to seek and enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution" (Art. 14, § 1)-these rights
would be denied if prisoners were repatriated by force to slave labor camps or
firing squads.
Principles of the Universal Declaration have been recognized in traditional
international law. States have protected human rights by granting asylum,
long an international institution. 8 The United States throughout her history
has exercised the right to grant asylum. 70 Moreover, she has consistently
75. See text at pages 402-3 supra.
76. For two views on the importance and legal authority of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, see U.N., THE IMPACT OF THE UNiVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, U.N. PuB. ST/SOA/5, pp. 3-8 (1952), and LAUTMWFACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND H UMAN RIGHTS 394-428 (1950).
77. One of the aims of the United Nations is to act so as "to reaffirm falth in funda.
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small." U.N. CHARTER Preamble. One of its
purposes is to promote and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all... Id. at Art. 1.
78. See, e.g., FExwNc i, INTERNATIONAL LAw 473-4 (3d ed. 1948); 2 HACWORTu,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 191-6 (1941); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1014
(2d ed. 1945) ; 1 OPPENHELm, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 316 (7th ed,, Lauterpacht, 1948);
Reale, Le Droit d'Asile, 63 HAGUE RECUE.IL DES COURs 470 (1938); Colombian-Peruvian
Asylum Case, I.CJ. REPORTS 266, 274 (1950).
The asylum referred to in the text is not the controversial "diplomatic asylum,"
79. ". . . [Ilt is the traditional policy of the Government of the United States to
grant refuge in its territory to persons whose lives are believed to be in jeopardy as a
result of their political activities in a foreign country." Quoted in 3 HAcKWORTH, op. Cit,
supra note 78, at 734. For recent instances which apply this principle, see N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1952, p. 3, col. 7; Sept. 19, 1952, p. 3, col. 5.
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refused to extradite aliens likely to face persecution.80 Constitutions of the
Soviet Union and many of her satellites proclaim that "those persecuted for
defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activi-
ties, or for their struggle for national liberation" have a right of asylum with-
in these countries.81 Constitutions of certain western nations extend a right
of asylum to those persecuted for "political" reasons.8 2 Most states, however,
do not extend asylum as a right.83 These disparate views conform to general
international law, which holds that on the question of refusing to admit or
expel aliens the state is sovereign. 4 By invoking asylum a captor can thus
justify its refusal to repatriate prisoners of war whose rights might be vio-
lated if they are forced to return. Mr. Vryshinsky argues that prisoners have
no right to seek and enjoy a grant of territorial asylum, because of their
special status as soldiers of their nation-states.
80. "In almost all extradition treaties to which the United States has hn a party
there is a provision expressly declaring that persons charged with the commission of
political offenses shall not be surrendered." 2 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 7S, at 1020. See
also the statement of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish: "A large proportion of those who
sought refuge on our shores prior to the formation of this Government, sought this
country for the enjoyment of freedom of opinion on political and religious subjects, and
their descendants have not forgotten the value of an asylum nor the obligation of a state
to shelter and protect political refugees. Neither the extradition clause in the treaty of
1794 nor in that of 1842 contains any reference to immunity for political offenses, or to
the protection of asylum for political or religious refugees. The public sentiment of bcth
countries made it unnecessary. Between the United States and Great Britain, it was not
supposed, on either side, that guarantees were required of each other against a thing
inherently impossible... ' DFAnT-rnur oF STATE, ForIGN R-.ATIoNis oF Tan UNrI=
ST,!Tzs-1876, p. 237 (1876).
81. U.S.S.R. CoNsT. Art. 129 (1936) (reprinted in Yr.AnooK o: Hr.rta:z RiHs
FOR 1946, p. 316 (1947)). See comments in Vysi:zsv. Tur Lxw KIF THE SWMTir STATZ
633-6 (Babb's transL 1948). For a typical "People's Republic" following the language of
the U.S.S.R. CoNsT., see ALBAxrA CoNsr. Art. 36 (1946) (reprinted in Ynmnlzoaz o7
HumAx RIGHTS roR 1946, p. 5 (1947)).
82. See, e.g., FR.ANcE CoNsr. Preamble (1946) (reprinted in YER.oon o7 Hugrz.
RIGHTS FOR 1946, p. 105 (1947)).
Constitutions of certain Latin American states offer asylum as a right to perons
persecuted "for political reasons." E.g., CoNsTrTUTIO or CnA, JU.Y, 1940, Art. 31 (re-
printed in YARnoon or HumAi_ RIGHTS roR 1946, p. 75 (1947)).
83. Most states have not admitted a right of individuals to demand and to receive
asylum in their territory. 1 OppmExEm, op. cit. supra nmte 74, at (1g; M orgenstern,
The Right of Asylum, 26 BRrr. Y.B. INTL L. 327 (1949 ).
For the attitude of U.S. courts, see, e.g.: "But the right is that of the State voluntarily
to offer asylum, not that of the fugitive to insist on it." Chandler v. United States, 171
F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1949).
84. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEDI, op. cit. supra note 78, at 615-21. See also the position of
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); United
States v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1932); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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"[T]hey are bound by the oath of loyalty which they gave their
fatherlands; . . . they remain bound by their duty as soldiers to
their fatherlands, their armies."' ' s
No authority is offered for this innovation, and there is no justification for
discriminating against soldiers in such a manner. For this thinking contradicts
a fundamental premise of all human rights: equal treatment for all regardless
of status. Furthermore, in practice, states have given protection to prisoners
of war who have not wished repatriation. 0 Most post-World War I peace
treaties and repatriation agreements permitted prisoners to remain in the terri-
tory of their captor.87
Even assuming arguendo that Article 118 of the 1949 Convention uncon-
ditionally requires detaining powers to repatriate all captives,88 the traditional
doctrine of "humanitarian intervention"8 9 lends support to non-compliance
85. From Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the 529th Meeting of Committee I of the
General Assembly, Nov. 24, 1952. U.S. DELEG. Doc. U.S./A/C.1/2543, p. 5 (1952).
86. See FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR 141-7 (1942) and references therein cited;
CAHEN-SALVAD OR, LEs PusoNNMERs DE GumuR 304-5 (1929); and the report of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to the Conference of Government Experts,
see note 46 mupra.
87. Most peace treaties and agreements relating to the repatriation of prisoners of
war concluded after World War I contained provisions permitting prisoners to remain in
the territory of their captors or go elsewhere. Most treaties and agreements concluded
by Soviet Russia made such provisions. These treaties and agreements were cited by
Secretary of State Acheson, in his statement on Korea made to Committee I of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, Oct. 24, 1952. The peace treaties which the
Allied and associated powers concluded with Germany, Austria and Hungary respected
the wishes of prisoners of war who did not wish to be repatriated. Article 220 of the
Treaty of Versailles provided that: "Prisoners of war or other German nationals who
do not desire to be repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and
Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them or to
take them to a neutral country or to allow them to reside in their own territories." 3
MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL Ac's, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEnMENTS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PowERs 3329, 3416 (1923). The same clause
was included in Article 166 of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain en Laye with Austria,
id. at 3149, 3200; and in Article 150 of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, id. at 3539, 3586.
Similar provisions were contained in the German-Latvian Agreement Concerning the
Exchange of their Respective Military and Civilian Prisoners, concluded April 20, 1920,
2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SRis 74 (1920); the German-Finnish Peace Treaty,
signed March 7, 1918, 10 MARTENS, REcuEI. 3D SER. 835, 841 (1920); the Peace Treaty
between Finland and Austria-Hungary, signed May 29, 1918, Art. 7, 12 MARTE=S,
REcuEU. 3D Smr. 17, 24 (1924) ; and the German-Polish Treaty Concerning the Liberation
of Prisoners, Interned and Hostages, signed Oct. 1, 1919, Supplementary Treaty and Ex-
change of Notes, 16 MARTENS, RECUEIL 3D SER. 330-6 (1927).
88. This essentially is the communist position. See text at page 391 supra.
89. Although in principle a nation-state can do with its nationals what it wishes,
the doctrine and practices of "humanitarian intervention" indicate that there are limits
to that discretion. When a state treats its nationals in such a way as to shock the con-
science of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity may be legally permissible
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with such a rule where prisoners' human rights might be violated. The United
Nations Charter has not abolished "humanitarian intervention"; the Charter
merely prohibits interference "in matters which essentially are within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."0 0 If there is widespread denial of basic
human rights, a state cannot invoke domestic jurisdiction despite the fact
that the violations occur within the state's own territory and are imposed on
its nationals. By authorizing a three-man commission to investigate race
policies of Prime Minister Malan's South African government, the United
Nations recognized that a state's attack on the basic human rights of its
citizens threatens peace and therefore is a matter of international, not domestic
concern. 91 Refusal to repatriate prisoners of war in the name of human rights
resembles humanitarian intervention, but the two are not identical since this
refusal does not involve a violation of territorial sovereignty. Under our
present assumption, refusal to repatriate violates a treaty provision-Article
118. Yet treaties or rules of customary international law become inapplicable
when the needs of the world community require non-compliance.02 Since even
the sacrosanct principle of territorial sovereignty can be overridden to pro-
tect human rights, a specific treaty provision cannot thwart achievement of
humanitarian goals, especially when the treaty itself was conceived solely to
promote these objectives.
even though a violation of the sovereignty of another state would occur as a result. In
the past, particular states have acted in accordance with "humanitarian intervention"
when their sense of justice was outraged, not when rights established by international
law were violated. See e.g., Bu=na & MAcconY, THE Dnv P=iopmrr o  IirrmuAO-NAL
LAw 69-73 (1928) ; FENn;'Icx, op. cit. supra note 78, at 242; LAuTmP.AcHT, op. cit. mpra
note 76, at 120-2; 1 OPzr., op. cit. supra note 78, at 279-S; Wmso:. & Tucrazi,
INTEruATIONAL LAw 95-6 (9th ed. 1935) ; Stowell, Hunzi:itarian Intcr-,ention, 33 Am. J.
IN'L L. 733 (1939).
90. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter.. . " U.N. CHAmrER Art. 2, § 7. For detailed discussion of this section, see Goom-
RICH & 1L'nRo, CHAE OF THE UNTEm NATiONs 110-121 (2d ed. 1949); Kam, THE
LAw OF THE UNrrzs N.xIoNs c. 19, § 1 (1950). See also MacChesney, Intrtalioral
Protection of Humzan Rights in the United Nations, 47 N.U.L. Rav. 193, 203-5 (1952).
91. On November 20, 1952, the General Assembly's Special Political Committee voted
35-2 to have a three-man commission "'study the race situation" in South Africa, and
rejected, 45-6, South Africa's contention that the United Nations was barred from in-
vestigating this problem as a matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of...
[a] state." N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1952, p. 1, col. 1; p. 4, col 4.
"The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations
which are likely to endanger international peace and security." U.N. CMaM-r Art. 11,
§ 3. "The Security Council shall determine the exdstence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what mea-
sures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.
at Art. 39.
92. 1 OPPzirn, op. cit. supra note 78, at 336-7.
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The literalist view that repatriation of all prisoners is mandatory disre-
gards the purposes and history of the 1949 Geneva Convention and the need
to refer to conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is made. But does
the proper method of treaty interpretation obligate a state to grant asylum,
or does it make refusal to repatriate merely a matter of discretion? Though
those who framed the Convention followed the traditional doctrine of asylum
by rejecting the suggestion that asylum should be obligatory, what they op-
posed was a general obligation-asylum for all prisoners under all circum-
stances. In the light of the mandatory provision of the Convention that "pris-
oners of war must at all times be humanely treated,"9 3 an obligation to grant
asylum does exist when repatriation would result in deprivation of human
rights and where the prisoner has supplied convincing evidence that in his
case there is no justification for the Convention's assumption that the para-
mount desire of a prisoner is to go home. Thus detaining powers must not
repatriate prisoners of war if (a) it is reasonable to conclude that they would
be deprived of fundamental human rights upon return; and (b) if the pris-
oner himself opposes repatriation so strongly that it could be effected only
by using force.
APPLYING THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION
After one accepts the correct interpretation of the repatriation provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Convention, as the U.N. has done, the problem of appli-
cation remains. The United Nations, or any future decision-maker must
answer, at least by implication, these questions: What standards should be
used to judge whether treatment of repatriated prisoners by the home state
represents a denial of human rights? In a given situation does available evi-
dence give reason to believe that upon repatriation prisoners would receive
treatment constituting such a denial? And finally, does a prisoner of war
oppose repatriation so strongly that he can be sent home only by using force?
Establishing Standards
All members of the United Nations accept certain human rights. They
have agreed to the general formulae contained in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, such as the provision that no one shall be subjected to
"slavery or servitude" or "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 9D4
Since the communist and non-communist worlds exhibit fundamental dis-
agreement as to what kinds of state practices must be characterized as
"slavery" or "inhuman treatment," it is not now possible to articulate shared
a priori standards. An illustration of this impasse is found in the failure of the
Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations to draw up generally
93. GENEVA CONVENTIoN RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR,
AUGUST 12, 1949, Art. 13 (1949).
94. See text at page 406 supra.
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acceptable Covenants of Human Rights.95 When disagreement exists, how-
ever, specific meaning can still be given to general formulae by a series of
authoritative decisions or shared practices. For example, general concepts
of the 14th Amendment have been given specific content with respect to civil
rights only after decades of judicial construction. Similarly, specific stand-
ards for general formulae of human rights may one day emerge from inter-
national, and particularly United Nations, practices and decisions. But e::ist-
ing inchoate standards could not serve as a reliable guide to the United
Nations at the time it applied the 1949 Convention to Korea. The General
Assembly avoided setting forth specific standards by which the world could
judge whether the treatment accorded repatriated prisoners would represent
a denial of human rights. The Resolution of December 3, 1952, presented
as a basis for settlement of the prisoner problem, held only that "force shall
not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their
homelands and no violence to their dignity or self-respect shall he permitted
in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever." 0 But since, by itself, em-
ployment of force to effect repatriation has never been considered a violation
of human rights, the position taken by the United Nations Command and the
General Assembly must have been based on a tacit assumption that prisoners
forced to return would be exposed to deprivations. This assumption was made
articulate only by leaders of the United States and Britain, who stressed that
human rights are violated if repatriated prisoners are committed to forced
labor camps or executed arbitrarilyY Although Western values, not general
international agreement, underlie the United Nations repatriation proposals,
to have spelled out even these standards in the December Resolution would
have filled a real need in international law.
Finding the Facts
Application of the 1949 Geneva Convention requires a factual determination
of the treatment which awaits repatriated prisoners of war. Decisions on re-
patriation should be made with express reference to facts found through
95. At the eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights t,,o draft covenants,
one on "Civil and Political Rights," and the other on "Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights," were prepared. As yet they have not been accepted. U.N. CoMi41ssxoN oN
H-uAx RIGHTs, REPORT OF THE EIGHTH SESSION (14 April-14 June 1952); ECOSOC
OFmFcIL Rrcoms: FouRTEErT SEssioN, Sutp. No. 4 (1952) ; and 13 U.N. BuL. 24S-57
(1952).
96. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1952, p. 3, col. 1; Dec. 4, 1952, p. 3, col. 1. The U.N. Resolution,
as Mr. Vyshinsky has pointed out, is not clear as to whether the use of force or the return
itself would be a violation of human rights.
97. In a speech at Guildhall, London on November 10, 1952, Prime Minister Churchill
declared: "It would be dishonour to send thousands of helpless prisoners of war back by
force to be massacred by a Chinese Communist Government which boasts that it has
actually rid itself of two millions of its own people." The Times, Nov. 11, 1952, p. 6,
col. 6. See also President Truman's statement, text at page 392, supra.
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adequate fact finding procedures. In the present controversy United Nations
pronouncements and General Assembly debates have referred to no specific
information on relevant Chinese and North Korean practices. What has been
said is contained in the general statements of Western leaders. But we must
assume that those responsible for the United Nations stand on repatriation
concluded from a study of available information that prisoners forcibly re-
turned to North Korea and China most likely would be sent to forced labor
camps or arbitrarily executed. However, reference to these facts by the United
Nations Command or the General Assembly would have made communist
acceptance of U.N. proposals impossible from the outset. Although the in-
formation relied on by the United Nations may have been gathered by ob-
jective observers, under ideal conditions fact finding should not be left to any
nation or organization with a direct stake in the outcome of the investigation.
But Chinese and North Korean communists have allowed no organization,
including the traditionally neutral Red Cross, to investigate even their pris-
oner-of-war camps.9 8 In view of this opposition, it would be naive to expect
the communist governments to acquiesce in an investigation of treatment
accorded their own nationals. Furthermore, attempts to conclude speedy
armistice surely would have been frustrated by United Nations insistence on
a formal fact finding process as a prerequisite to the settlement of the re-
patriation issue.
Ascertaining Prisoners' Resistance to Repatriation
If the facts show that repatriation endangers prisoners' rights, there remains
the task of ascertaining the degree of prisoner resistance to repatriation. The
actual use of force is the only direct way of finding out if force is necessary.
But this technique would be repugnant to accepted concepts of human dig-
nity. There are other methods, however, for making the necessary predic-
tion. Perhaps responses elicited during interrogation provide the most reliable
means of prediction. Whatever specific method is used, the aim should be
to obtain a reaction not evoked by intimidation or misleading propaganda.
The United Nations attempted to obtain such a response in April, 1952,
when it interrogated most Chinese and Korean captives. Some could not
be questioned, because opposition to interrogation was too strong in com-
munist-dominated POW compounds. 9  Written notices appeared in the
camps, and announcements were made over public address systems that all
persons were to be interrogated by impartial United Nations Command per-
sonnel to decide who would want to be repatriated and who had "compelling
reasons" for refusing repatriation.1 00 These announcements emphasized the
98. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE PROBLEM OF PEACE ix KoREA-AN ORAL REPoRT
BY SEca ARY or STATE DEAN ACHESoN, OcTomm 24, 1952, pp. 29-30 (1952).
99. KoREA: A SumMARY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
100. Id. at 10, 19 (Annex XIII).
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importance of the decision about to be made by the prisoner and its possible
adverse effects on his family at home. Full publicity was given to communist
assurances of amnesty to all prisoners regardless of their conduct while cap-
tives of the United Nations.' 0 ' An interviewer questioned each person
separately. Koreans were interrogated by South Korean civilians under the
general supervision of United States personnel, while the Chinese were
screened by Chinese spealing United States servicemen. 02 On the basis of a
prisoner's answers to specific questions,'02 the United Nations predicted
whether or not force would be necessary to effect his return. Unless answers
indicated the person would commit suicide, escape, fight to the death, or take
other desperate measures to avoid repatriation, the individual vas placed on
the list of those who were to be sent home.0-1 It is possible that these tests
of a prisoner's opposition were even stricter than might be necessary to show
that force would be needed to effect repatriation.
This screening process was attacked in the United Nations by Mr. Vyshin-
sky. He argued that the April screening, or any other interrogation of war
captives, even under the most ideal conditions, could not be free of coercion.
"[T] hey [the supporters of the United Nations position] completely
ignore the simple and elementary idea that under conditions of war
imprisonment there is not and cannot be the most minimum con-
ditions for the free expression of the will of any war prisoner."'10
But those who drafted the 1949 Geneva Convention-Russians among them
-assumed that a free expression of will under conditions of war imprisonment
is possible, for Article 109 of the Convention provides that a sick or wounded
prisoner eligible to be sent home is not to be "repatriated against his will
during hostilities." Perhaps the United Nations might have avoided some
attacks on the screening process if it had delegated the interrogation to a
101. Id. at 10.
102. Ibid. The entire interrogation lasted ninety seconds. Barrett & Barrett, Why
Our Red Priso;ers Refuse to Go Home, 7 The Reporter, Aug. 5, 1952, p. 22.
103. Questions put to Chinese prisoners during the April screening were as follows:
"1. Will you voluntarily be repatriated to North Korea or China?
-2. Would you forcibly resist repatriation?
-3. Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family?
"4. Do you realise that you may remain here at Koje-do long after those electing
repatriation have been returned home?
"5. Do you realise that the UNC cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain
place?
"6. Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation?
-7. What would you do if you were repatriated in spite of this decision?"
Similar questions were put to North Korean prisoners during the April screening.
KoRzA: A SumaIARY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 21.
104. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1952, p. 2, col. 2.
105. Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the 521st .Meeting of Committee I. Nuv. 10, 1952
U.S. DEix.. Doc. U.S./A/C.1/2540, p. 19 (1952).
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neutral nation or organization. But even the Repatriation Commission, pro-
posed in the December Resolution of the General Assembly, might be charged
with bias. For in a bi-polar world it is difficult to find an organization or
state not exposed to accusations of partiality.10
Application of the correct interpretation of the 1949 Convention may pose
the practical problem of what to do with large numbers of men. Detaining
powers obligated to grant prisoners permanent asylum would be saddled with
serious and often unjustifiable burdens, as the Delegates to the 1949 Diplo-
matic Conference pointed out. 107 For this reason, most states have opposed
the articulation of a right to asylum.'08 Thus many belligerents might refuse
to apply the correct interpretation of the Convention if the obligation not to
repatriate were to involve a further obligation to provide a permanent home
for displaced prisoners. After World War II the responsibility for the care
and resettlement of displaced persons was declared to be a matter of inter-
national concern. 1 9 Similarly, the burden of providing for non-repatriated
prisoners of war should not be placed on detaining powers alone, but rather
on some international organization. Shifting the responsibility in this fashion
would ease the fear expressed at the 1949 Geneva Conference that a grant
of asylum will impose immense burdens on captor states. Though the post-
World War II agencies for the care of refugees-UNRRA and IRO-have
been disbanded, the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees 110
might be entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for non-repatriable pris-
oners of the Korean conflict or future wars. The United Nations Resolution
of December 3, 1952, calls upon a post-armistice "political conference" to
arrange for the disposition of unrepatriated Korean captives. If this con-
ference cannot solve the problem within 30 days, the responsibility is to de-
volve upon the United Nations."' But whatever organization is assigned this
106. Witness the current attacks being leveled at the International Red Cross. These
reached their height at the July, 1952, International Red Cross Conference. As a result
"the first serious pessimism regarding the future of the Red Cross had begun to pre-
occupy many of the delegates." N.Y. Times, July 31, 1952, p. 2, col. 5.
107. See text at page 403 supra.
108. See text at pages 403-5 supra.
109. See Ristelhueber, The International Refugee Organization, 470 INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION 167, 174-85 (1951); RAYMOND, THE JURIDICAL STATUs or DisrLACtv
PERsONs FROM SOVIET AND SoviET-DomiNATED TERITORY 167 (unpublished thesis in
Library of Congress, 1952).
110. For a discussion of his functions see YEARBOox OF THE UNITED NATioNS-1950,
p. 21 (1951).
111. "At the end of ninety days, after the armistice agreement has been signed, the
disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands may not have been
effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise
agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target
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problem, the solution reached must provide a brighter future than the one
from which the United Nations offers refuge.
A NEW POINT OF DEPARTURE
That international law should govern the Korean repatriation issue is the
common ground on which the communists and the United Nations stand.
Disagreement results from conflicting views of what the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention provides for the Korean situation. Claiming that its position is
"wholly consistent with" the Convention, and required by its general humani-
tarian principles, the United Nations holds that no prisoner will be forcibly
repatriated. The communists insist that Article 118, read in conjunction
with Articles 6 and 7, embodies "the law" and requires that all captives,
without exception, be repatriated. However, Article 118, in which Mr. Vyshin-
sky finds his "categoric formula," is directly applicable only "after cessation
of hostilities." These words were used to characterize a situation where no
military reason could justify the continued captivity of prisoners. The actions
and attitudes of both parties, however, indicate that the situation characterized
in Article 118 will not result from the conclusion of an armistice. The Rus-
sians themselves have said the cold war will continue. And concern over
defensible cease-fire lines and the rate of troop rotation during the negotiations
seems to indicate both parties believe military needs will be paramount even
after an armistice is concluded. Perhaps, then, through a fresh appraisal of the
facts, the communists and the United Nations can agree on a repatriation
formula based on another provision of the Convention. Article 109 might serve
this purpose. This article is designed to encourage exchange of prisoners when
the conditions referred to in Article 118 are not present. Article 109, in part,
provides that during hostilities, "Parties ...may . . . conclude agreements
with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of...
prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity." This pro-
vision contains nothing which can be construed as a "categoric formula." Thus
a state need not feel compelled by Convention language to insist upon the re-
patriation of all prisoners without exception.
1n many disputes the re-examination of the factual premises on which
seemingly irreconcilable positions are based has opened new avenues to honor-
able agreement. Yet even if the United Nations and the communists should
re-examine their positions, any agreement which might result must preserve
and promote the humanitarian purposes of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
date for the termination of their detention, to the political confereuce to be called as pro-
vided uuder Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. If, at the end of a further thirty
days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected
or provided for by the political conference the responsibility for their care and mainten-
ance until the end of their detention shall be transferred to the United Nations." N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1952, p. 3, col. 6.
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